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Many quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols require random choice of measurement basis for
each pulse or each train of pulses. In some QKD protocols, such as the Round-Robin Differential
Phase Shift (RRDPS) QKD protocol, this requirement is a bit challenging as randomly choosing
hundreds of settings for every, say, 100 pulses may be too fast with current technologies. In this
paper, we solve this issue by proving the security of QKD protocols with slow basis choice without
compromising the secret key rate. We also show that the random choice of the bases for the state
preparation can be made slow if the signals do not leak any information on the basis. Examples of
QKD protocols that our technique can apply include the RRDPS protocol and BB84-type protocols,
and our technique relaxes demands for the implementation of QKD systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–11] is an infor-
mationally secure way to share common random bits (the
secret key) between the two parties, called Alice and Bob.
Since QKD is a physical cryptography, its security proofs
need to assume some mathematical models of the devices
used in QKD systems. In particular, for simplicity of the
proof, those models are sometimes a bit demanding to
implement in practice, and this issue has to be solved for
the actual implementation of the protocol. For instance,
a perfect singe-photon source was assumed in the secu-
rity proof in [12], which is beyond current technologies,
and this assumption was later removed by the so-called
tagging idea, and now we are allowed to use a coherent
light source [13].
One of such demanding assumptions is that the mea-
surement basis is chosen randomly for each of the in-
coming pulses in order to prevent an eavesdropper, Eve,
from freely reading out the information. For example,
in the case of the Round-Robin Differential Phase Shift
(RRDPS) QKD protocol [14, 15], which is a recently pro-
posed protocol, the measurement setting has to be ran-
domly chosen from hundreds of settings for each of train
of pulses. Thanks to this measurement scheme, this pro-
tocol has a distinguished feature that the privacy ampli-
fication is totally independent of the signal disturbance.
Unfortunately, however, its implementation, especially
the measurement scheme with more than 100 settings,
is challenging in practice, although it is not impossible
with elaborating setups [16–18]. Therefore, it would sig-
nificantly make the implementation simpler if we can get
rid of this requirement of the fast optical switch from the
experiment.
In this paper, we remove the necessity of the demand-
ing fast switch by proving the security of the RRDPS
protocol with slow basis choice, and in the modified pro-
tocol we are allowed to switch the setting as frequent as
the occurrence of the detection events, rather than the
system clock rate. The proof technique can apply for
the BB84-type protocol as well, and we also show that
the random choice of the bases for the state preparation
can be made slow if the signals do not leak any informa-
tion on the basis. We note that slow basis choice has an
additional benefit of reducing the amount of the random
numbers that is used for the setting choices, which makes
the requirements for QKD systems even less demanding.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we show
that a naive slow basis choice of the measurement setting
renders a BB84 protocol insecure by explicitly introduce
an eavesdropping strategy. In Sec. III, we introduce a
secure BB84 protocol with slow basis choice, and show
its security. Our security proof is simple and applicable
to other QKD protocols, including the RRDPS proto-
col. In Sec. IV, we take the RRDPS protocol with the
photon-number-resolving detectors as an example to ex-
amine how the slow basis choice affects the secret key
rate. In Sec. V, we summarize this paper. In Appendix,
we analyze the effect of the initialization process of the
devices and the the threshold detectors having the dead
time in the case of the RRDPS protocol.
II. POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY
In this section, as an example that a naive slow choice
of the measurement setting results in breakage of the
security, we consider a particular BB84 protocol with
single-photon sources. Before presenting the protocol,
we introduce some terminologies and list up assumptions
we make. First, we call the two complementary bases in
the BB84 protocol as the Z basis and the X basis, and
we assume that Alice’s source is a single-photon source
and they use the Z basis to generate the final key. More-
over, as is the case in many security proofs [12, 19–21],
we assume that the detection efficiency of Bob’s mea-
surement apparatus is independent of the measurement
basis. With these assumptions, we describe the BB84
protocol with a naive slow choice of the measurement
setting, i.e., Bob chooses his measurement basis only for
every M time slots.
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21. Alice randomly selects the basis from the Z basis
or the X basis, and she also randomly chooses one
of the eigenstates in the chosen basis to encode a
bit in the single-photon pulse. Then, she sends the
pulse to Bob over a quantum channel. She repeats
this process many times.
2. Bob randomly chooses the measurement basis from
the Z basis or the X basis for each sequence of the
incoming pulses, which contains M pulses.
3. By using an authenticated classical public channel,
Alice and Bob keep those instances where Bob de-
tects the signals and Alice and Bob have chosen
the same bases. After this sifting step, they per-
form error correction and privacy amplification to
generate the final key.
In what follows, in order to see that the final key in this
protocol is insecure, we will explicitly construct an eaves-
dropping strategy against this protocol. For this, we de-
fine pZ (pX), η,Ntot, N, eZ , and , eX as the probability to
choose the Z (X) basis, the probability for Bob to detect
a photon sent from Alice, i.e., the transmission rate, the
number of pulses sent by Alice, the length of the sifted
key length, the error rate in the Z basis, and the error
rate in the X basis, respectively. To be more specific, we
set these parameters and the length M of the sequence
as pZ = pX = 0.01, η = 10
−6, Ntot = 1013, and M = 105,
respectively. With these numbers, we may expect the
length N of the sifted key to be 107 and Bob detects
a signal out of 106 pulses on average under the normal
operation without Eve. In order to let Eve possess the
power to cause the detection event at Bob’s side when-
ever she pleases, we assume that all the losses are under
Eve’s control. Under these assumptions, we consider the
following eavesdropping strategy.
1. Eve randomly chooses 99 sequences and 1 sequence
out of 108 sequences, temporarily stores all the
pulses in the chosen 100 sequences in her lab, and
then blocks and discards all the rest of the pulses.
2. Eve performs measurements to all the pulses in the
99 sequences with the Z basis, prepares pulses in
the states corresponding to the measurement out-
comes, and then sends all of the prepared pulses to
Bob.
3. Eve sends all the pulses in the 1 sequence to Bob
without performing any operation to them.
Now, we show that this eavesdropping renders the final
key insecure given that Bob does not monitor the bunch-
ing of the detection events. For this, first note that the
transmission rate is preserved as Eve sends 100M(= 107)
pulses to Bob in total. Next, we calculate the probabil-
ity that Alice and Bob end up with an identical final key
without noticing this eavesdropping, i.e., the joint prob-
ability that Bob chooses the Z basis for the sequences
that Eve has measured with the Z basis and he chooses
the X basis for the sequence without Eve’s disturbance.
It is straightforward to obtain this probability, and this
is given by 0.9999 × 0.01 ∼ 0.0004. Note that this prob-
ability is higher than the typical value of the security
parameter [22], like 10−10. Therefore, we conclude that
the final key fails to meet the typical security criteria,
implying the breakage of the security.
It is clear that this eavesdropping works out because
Alice and Bob ignore the bunching of the detection
events, and this attack should be detected by monitor-
ing this bunching. In the next section, we will make this
intuition more rigorous and present the explicit modifi-
cations that we need to make the protocol secure .
III. SECURITY PROOF FOR BB84 PROTOCOL
WITH SLOW BASIS CHOICE
In this section, we modify the protocol presented in
the previous section and show the security of the new
protocol. The modification is made between Step 2 and
Step 3 in the previous protocol, which is:
2.5 If Bob obtains more than 1 detection events in a
sequence, then he discard the sequence.
To see that the protocol with this additional step is se-
cure, we consider the protocol from the viewpoint of the
so-called entanglement based protocol [12, 19]. The en-
tanglement based protocol we will introduce is equivalent
to the modified protocol in the sense that all the quantum
and classical information accessible to Eve are exactly
the same, and Alice and Bob’s classical data remains the
same. Therefore, Eve cannot behave differently between
the two protocols, and we can use the entanglement based
protocol for the security proof. In particular, we consider
the following entanglement based protocol.
1. Alice prepares a qubit and makes it entangled with
the single photon in such a way that the photon
randomly becomes one of the Z (X) basis eigen-
states if the qubit is measured with the Z (X) ba-
sis. She sends the photon to Bob over the quantum
channel while she keeps the qubit on her side. She
repeats this process many times.
2. Bob measures the number of photons in each pulse,
counts the number of pulses that contains non-zero
photon in each of the sequences, and broadcasts the
latter numbers for each sequence over the authen-
ticate classical channel.
3. Alice and Bob keep those sequences where Bob de-
tects photons only in one pulse, and they discard
all the other sequences.
4. By using the authenticated classical channel, Bob
tells Alice the position of the pulse with the photons
for each of the surviving sequence.
35. According to the information from Bob, Alice dis-
cards all her qubits except those corresponding to
the pulses containing the photons in one pulse.
6. For each pair of the qubit and the pulse, Alice and
Bob randomly choose their bases and measure their
systems with the chosen bases.
7. Alice and Bob announce the basis they have used
for each pulse over the authenticated classical chan-
nel.
8. With the help of the authenticated classical public
channel, Alice and Bob keep those instances where
they have chosen the same basis. After this sifting,
they perform the estimation of the bit error rate
as well as the leaked information, followed by error
correction and privacy amplification to obtain the
final key.
The important point in this protocol is that Alice and
Bob’s bases choice are independently made after the post-
selection of the qubits and pulses in Step 6. This delayed
choice of the measurement bases is the key in the secu-
rity proof, and this idea is, in fact, used in many security
proofs for BB84 protocol [12, 19–21]. For instance, in
the Shor-Preskill’s security proof [12], the intuition of the
proof is that this delayed choice enables Alice and Bob
to symmetrize the shared quantum states without being
affected by Eve’s strategy, and this symmetry is enough
to prove the security. Moreover, the security proof based
on the complementarity scenario or the entropic uncer-
tainty relationship [20, 21] enables us to get rid of the
qubit assumption at Bob’s side, which is made in the
Shor-Preskill’s proof, allowing us to use threshold detec-
tors. Therefore, by directly applying such security proofs,
one can see that the above protocol is secure.
The above protocol can be simplified furthermore.
First, Alice can use a fixed basis over pulses in a se-
quence given that the single-photon source does not leak
any information on the basis. This is so because the se-
curity of the above protocol relies also on the fact that
Eve cannot obtain any information on Alice’s bases prior
to her attack. As long as this condition is satisfied, the
protocol is secure.
Next, observe that the fixed length of the sequence
M does not play any role in the security proof when
we use the single photon source. The only important
thing is that each post-selected sequence contains only
one detection event. This leads us to the following further
modification of the protocol: Bob immediately makes the
announcement upon obtaining the detection event, and
then Alice and Bob randomly choose the bases just after
this announcement. This modification is secure because
we still have only one detection event for each sequence,
whose length is now depending on the occurrence of the
detection events. This way we can reduce the number
of the sequences discarded in the protocol with a single-
photon source and we can improve the secret key gener-
ation rate without compromising the security.
So far, we have assumed the single-photon source, how-
ever, the practical implementations often employ a co-
herent light source. Note that we can apply our analysis
to this practical case if we employ the the decoy state
method [23–25]. This is so because this method allows
us to estimate the fraction of the detection events caused
by the sequences where Alice has emitted only a single-
photon, and this estimation is crucial for our proof to
apply.
To summarize, Bob can choose his measurement basis
after the detection event, and if the source does not leak
any information on the basis, then Alice is also allowed to
choose her basis just after Bob’s detection event. We note
that since this argument does not rely on what basis set
we use, we can also prove the security of other protocols,
such as the loss-tolerant protocols with three states [26],
with slow basis choice. In the case of the loss-tolerant
protocol with three states, however, Bob’s choice can be
made slow but Alice’s choice cannot be made slow as her
sending state leaks some basis information to Eve. In the
next section, we apply our idea to another protocol, the
RRDPS protocol.
IV. SECRET KEY RATE OF RRDPS
PROTOCOL WITH SLOW BASIS CHOICE
In this section, we first apply our idea to a RRDPS
protocol with slow basis choice, and then we examine
how the slow choice of the measurement basis affects the
secret key generation rate of the RRDPS protocol. Be-
fore we describe the RRDPS protocol, we define some
terminologies. We call bunches of pulses a block, and we
name collections of blocks as a sequence. Therefore, the
block corresponds to the pulse in the BB84 in the pre-
vious section. Keeping these terminologies in our mind,
the RRDPS protocol with the slow choice of the mea-
surement basis runs as follows.
1. Alice emits a train of weak coherent laser pulses
with an interval T to form a block consisting of L
pulses, applies a phase shift randomly chosen from
{0, pi} on each pulse, and then sends the block to
Bob through the quantum channel. Alice repeats
this many times.
2. For each sequence that consists of M blocks, Bob
first randomly chooses a number corresponding to
a delay time out of {T, 2T, · · · , (L−1)T}. Then, he
employs the chosen number as the delay time in a
variable-delay interferometer to interfere the pulses
in M blocks, i.e., in the sequence, and uses the
photon-number-resolving detectors to detect sig-
nals.
3. For each sequence, Bob keeps only one block if it
is the first block with the detection event and the
block contains only one photon. Otherwise, he dis-
cards the sequence. Bob announces to Alice over
4the authenticated classical channel which sequences
have been discarded.
4. For each sifted sequence, Bob records the bit value
depending on the measurement outcome and an-
nounces over the authenticated classical channel
the delay time used in Step 2 as well as the po-
sition of the surviving block in the sequence.
5. By using the information from Bob, Alice computes
the bit values for each of the sifted sequence.
6. Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy
amplification to obtain the final key.
Note in this protocol that M represents how slow the
choice of the measurement basis is, and M = 1 corre-
sponds to the case of the original RRDPS protocol.
The security of this RRDPS protocol with slow ba-
sis choice can be justified with the same manner as the
one of the BB84-type protocols in the previous section.
That is, the measurement basis choice for the surviving
block for the detection event can in principle be delayed
after the detection of the photons by a fictitious QND
measurement [15] measuring the photon number of the
block, and this basis choice is random as is the case for
the original RRDPS protocol. It means that we can use
the same security proof, and the similar key rate formula
to the original protocol can be achieved [14]. Having said
this, however, note that in the original proof, the blocks
are evaluated by esrc, which is the rate of the blocks which
contains more than νth photons at Alice’s side. In our
protocol, we have to replace esrc with esrc,slow, which is
the probability that there is at least one block containing
larger than νth photons in a sequence at Alice’s side, and
it is written as
esrc,slow = 1− (1− esrc)M . (1)
By directly borrowing the security proof of the original
RRDPS protocol, we have the secret key generation rate
G per pulse in our RRDPS protocol as
G =
Q
ML
(1− h(ebit)− h (eph)) , (2)
eph =
esrc,slow
Q
+
(
1− esrc,slow
Q
)
νth
L− 1 , (3)
where Q is the detection rate per sequence, ebit is the bit
error rate, and eph is the so-called phase error rate that
is used in privacy amplification to generate the secret key
[12, 14, 21].
To simulate the resulting secret key generation rate of
our RRDPS protocol with the block size L = 128, we
assume the following channel model. The experimental
setup has an inevitable system error, whose error rate is
esys, and this error is independent of the channel trans-
mission and the dark count rate dc of the detectors, and
esys and dc are assumed to be 0.03 and 10
−9, respectively.
As for Alice, she uses a coherent light source, and it
leads to the expression of esrc as 1−e−Lµ
∑νth
ν=0(Lµ)
ν/ν!,
where µ is the average photon number per pulse. The ex-
plicit expressions of Q and ebit under these assumptions
are provided in Appendix. Under these assumptions, in
Fig. 1, we show the resulting secret key generation rate
per pulse as a function of the transmission rate of the
quantum channel between Alice and Bob, where we vary
the size M of the sequence from 1 to 106. We have opti-
mized µ and νth in the simulations. Note that the above
protocol assumes the use of photon-number-resolving de-
tectors, however, we show in Appendix that we can use
the threshold detectors having the dead time without
frustrating the key rate (see Appendix and Fig. 3). More-
over, we can accommodate the effect of the initialization
process of the devices and its effect is shown not to be
very small (see Fig. 4).
We find in Fig. 1 that the key rates for each M be-
comes constant when the channel transmission rate η is
high. On the other hand, when η is low, all the key rates
converge to the one of M = 1. This clearly shows that
we can safely adopt the slow basis choice without mak-
ing any compromise in the high loss regime. In order to
explain these tendencies in the normal operation without
eavesdropping, we consider two extreme cases Mη  1
and Mη  1. Here, Mη is regarded as the effective trans-
mission rate per block because the mean photon number
of a sequence after the transmission is given by MηLµ.
In the case of Mη  1, that is, in the high transmission
regime, the detection rate is saturated, and therefore the
key rate is also saturated because the detection rate is the
key factor determining the key generation rate, which in-
tuitively explains the saturation in Fig. 1. On the other
hand, in the case of Mη  1, the mean photon number
of each of the pulse is so small that the multi-detection in
the same sequence rarely happens. It means that the de-
tection rate does not depend on the size of the sequence
or the block, and it explains the convergence in Fig. 1.
We remark that since the above discussion does not ex-
plicitly use the properties of the RRDPS protocol, these
tendencies should hold also in other QKD protocols.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we first show that a naive slow basis
choice for the BB84 protocol results in the generation
of an insecure key by explicitly constructing an eaves-
dropping. Then, we see that this vulnerability can be
circumvented by a slight modification of the sifting pro-
cess in the post-processing of the protocol, and we prove
the security of the modified protocol. Our proof does not
exploit the detailed structure of the protocol, and it can
apply to other protocols, such as the loss-tolerant proto-
cols. We also show that random choice of bases for the
state preparation can be made slow for those protocols
if the signals does not leak any information on the basis.
Finally, in order to show how the slow basis choice affects
the secret key generation rate, we simulate the resulting
5FIG. 1. The secret key generation rate of the RRDPS proto-
col with slow basis choice and photon-number-resolving de-
tectors versus channel transmission. Lines labeled by (i)-
(vii) represent the case of the sequence with the length of
1, 10, 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106, respectively.
secret key generation rate of the RRDPS protocol with
slow basis choice. It follows from the simulation results
and the key formula that the choice can be made as slow
as Bob’s detection rate of the pulse without compromis-
ing the key rate in typical experiments.
In this paper, we do not consider Bob who processes
the data from a bunch of pulses that contains more than
one photon, but instead Bob who discards such data.
We may be able to accommodate such data in the secu-
rity proof by modifying the post-processing furthermore.
Having said that, however, the accommodation of such
data does not significantly increase the secret key gener-
ation rate so much as the number of such data is very low
compared to the one of the data from only one photon.
Moreover, it is doubtful if it is still beneficial to consider
such a rare event in practice cases where finite-size effects
have to be accommodated. In this case, we usually need
to send huge number of pulses to obtain a positive gain,
which is not practical, and therefore, we do not take into
account such data in the present work.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we consider the effect of the initial-
ization process of the slow device and how to use the
threshold detectors with the dead time. We also provide
FIG. 2. A measurement setup to estimate the number of
sequences that include more than one photon. The beam
dump simply blocks all the pulses along the longer path that
is used in the standard measurement.
the explicit expressions of the parameters needed for the
simulations.
First, we consider the initialization process. In the ac-
tual experiment, we sometimes need to wait a certain
period of time after every sequence. For example, if we
use the slow optical switches to change the basis, we need
to wait until the switching process is completed. We also
have to consider the effect of the dead time of the pho-
ton detectors. All devices have to be initialized before the
next sequence, and we discard the data obtained during
the initialization process because the assumptions made
in the security proof are not satisfied during the process.
Now suppose that all devices are initialized in a fixed pe-
riod of time from the end of each sequence, and let cd be
the number of pulses emitted by the light source during
the period. Note that we have to be careful about the
initialization of the photon detectors in a fixed period be-
cause the dead time can be prolonged by the additional
input [27, 28]. In order to avoid this problem, we assume
that all inputs into the photon detectors are blocked dur-
ing the initialization process. Since all the pulses during
the initialization process are blocked, the security proof
for the key from the sequence can apply without any
modification. The only thing we have to change is the
factor ML in Eq. (2) because Eq. (2) represents the key
rate per pulse, and the effect of the initialization must be
taken into account in this rate. Thus, we replace the fac-
tor ML in Eq. (2) with ML + cd, but the other factors,
such as M in Eq. (1), do not change.
Next, we consider the use of the threshold detectors
rather than the photon-number-resolving detectors as-
sumed in the original RRDPS protocol as well as the
one in the main text. To prove the security in this sce-
nario, first note that it loses no generalities if we assume
Bob who performs a fictitious QND measurement [29–32]
counting the number of photons in each block. This is
so because the interferometer is a linear-optical device,
and therefore, the QND measurement does not disturb
Bob’s measurement outcomes. Therefore, we are allowed
to regard the state of each block as a classical mixture of
the Fock diagonal state, and our task is to estimate the
6FIG. 3. The secret key generation rate of the RRDPS proto-
col with slow basis choice and the threshold detectors versus
channel transmission. Lines labeled by (i)-(vii) represent the
case of the sequence with the length of 1, 10, 102, 103, 104, 105,
and 106, respectively.
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FIG. 4. The secret key generation rate of the RRDPS protocol
with slow basis choice and the threshold detectors having the
dead time versus channel transmission. A solid line, a dashed
line, and a dotted line represent the rate for cd = 0 and M =
103, for cd = 1.28 × 105 and the optimal M for each η, and
for cd = 1.28× 105 and M = 103, respectively.
lower bound of the number of the sifted blocks containing
only a single photon (note that the security proof of the
original RRDPS protocol highly relies on the detection
of a single photon). As we will see below, this number
is estimated from double-count events in a measurement
scheme depicted in Fig. 2, which is randomly chosen by
Bob, and the beam dump blocks one of the paths in the
interferometer. As for the multiple photons in the sifted
blocks, we employ the tagging idea in GLLP analysis [13],
i.e., we assume the worst case scenario that Eve has the
maximum information on those instances.
For the estimation of the lower bound, Bob randomly
chooses sequences and measures them with the measure-
ment setup in Fig. 2 instead of the variable-delay interfer-
ometer. In this setup, we define the double-count event as
follows. In this event, both of the detectors click within a
block, and moreover, this event has to be the first among
blocks with click events of at least one of the detectors.
If the dead time of the detectors were short enough to
be negligible, we would also use multi-click events of the
same detector within a block for the estimation. Unfor-
tunately, however, the dead time of the actual photon
detectors is not negligible, and we cannot necessarily use
the second detection of the same detector. Therefore, we
conservatively adopt the above definition with the accom-
modation of only the first clicks of the two detectors in
a block. We note that even if the dead time is prolonged
with a side-channel, it does not affect the rate of having
the double-count given that the initialization process is
properly completed after every sequence.
Now, we consider the relation between the double-
count event and the sequence including more than one
photon. The probability that a photon, which is in-
coming to the input port of the measurement scheme in
Fig. 2, is detected in either detector is 1/2. When one
of the detectors is in dead time, the probability that a
photon is detected in the other detector is 1/4. Thus,
when there are more than one photon in a block, the
probability of having the double-count event in the block
is at least 1/8. This means that the number of blocks
including more than one photon can be lower bounded
by eight times of the one of the double counts.
From these results, we can obtain the modified key rate
formula as
G =
Q
ML+ cd
(
1− h(ebit)− emB
Q
−
(
1− emB
Q
)
h (eph)
)
, (A.1)
eph =
esrc,slow
Q− emB +
(
1− esrc,slow
Q− emB
)
νth
L− 1 , (A.2)
where emB is eight times the rate of the double-count
events at Bob’s side per sequence.
Next, we provide the explicit expressions of Q, ebit, and
emB with the use of the threshold detectors and the ac-
commodation of the initialization process under the nor-
mal operation without Eve. The main contribution of
Q is a block containing one photon or a dark count af-
ter blocks including zero photon without dark counts.
Therefore, we have that
Q ∼
M−1∑
m=0
(
e−Lηµ(1− dc)2L
)m(1
2
Lηµe−Lηµ + Ldc
)
,
(A.3)
where η is a transmission rate, µ is an average photon
number per coherent pulse and the factor 12 corresponds
to the efficiency of delay line interferometer. The bit error
occurs when the system error or the dark count at the
wrong output port happens. This leads to the expression
7of ebit as
ebit ∼∑M−1
m=0
(
e−Lηµ(1− dc)2L
)m ( 1
2Lηµe
−Lηµesys + Ldc 12
)
Q
.
(A.4)
Since both signal photons and dark counts can cause dou-
ble counts, emB is approximated as
emB ∼8
M−1∑
m=0
(
e−Lηµ(1− dc)2L
)m(1
8
1
2
(Lηµ)
2
e−Lηµ
+
1
2
Lηµe−Lηµ(2L− 1)dc + 2L(2L− 1)
2
d2c
)
.
(A.5)
Now let us consider the effect of replacing the key
rate formulae Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) with Eq. (A.1) and
Eq. (A.2). The graph of the key rate formula Eq. (A.1)
with cd = 0 is illustrated in Fig. 3. We can find that this
graph is almost the same as the one presented in Fig. 1.
This is so mainly because emB is very small and negligi-
ble, and this means in particular that we can safely use
the threshold detectors without frustrating the key rate.
Next, we consider the effect of a non-zero dead time
cd. When cd is zero, the key rate always becomes larger
by taking a smaller M . When cd is not zero, however,
it is not the case. For instance, the key rate becomes
larger by taking a larger M if M is not large enough
to cause the saturation of the detection rate. Therefore,
we have to conduct the optimization of M as well as µ
and νth for each η. In Fig. 4, we illustrate the key rate
for cd = 1.28 × 105 with the optimal µ, νth, and M as
the dashed line when the other settings are the same as
that in Fig. 3. We also plot the key rate for cd = 0 and
M = 103 (solid line) and the one for cd = 1.28× 105 and
M = 103 (dotted line), respectively. As can be seen from
Fig. 4, we can obtain a nearly optimal key rate by setting
M to a fixed value satisfying ML = cd. This means that
we set the time spent by a sequence to be equal to the
dead time although this simplification can cause the key
rate to decrease from the optimal one by a factor of 1/2.
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